On the pages of foreign periodicals and special literature, more and more materials are gradually appearing concerning various aspects of the prehistory of the 1950-1953 war in Korea. Bourgeois authors try to assign responsibility for its beginning, as a rule, to the DPRK or even to the USSR. However, the further we go, the more the true background of the events of that time is revealed, which consisted in the efforts that the American and South Korean reaction made in order to provoke a war against the DPRK. The roots of this reckless policy go back to the years before the war, and one of its apologists is Robert Oliver.

In an interview with the author of these lines during the Congress of Orientalists held in Moscow, an American international historian, Prof. White mentioned, with a touch of disdain, Robert Oliver, who tried to gain fame in the field of science, to become a recognized expert on Korea, but gained infamous fame in the field of propaganda of anti-Sovietism and anti-communism. Perhaps some other respectable representatives of the American scientific world do not take this gentleman seriously? Doesn't this mean that we should simply ignore his "creativity"? It is possible that this would be so, if, first of all, it were not for the legends created by the propagandist of the South Korean reaction R. Oliver. These legends migrate from the pages of numerous books and articles by R. Oliver to other publications; they found a place in the plump volumes of the Bulletin of the US Congress, in official documents of the White House. Secondly, the very personality of Oliver deserves attention. His position as a close and longtime friend of former South Korean President Lee Seung-man, a trusted adviser to the pro-American circles of Korean emigration, and then an adviser to the Lee Seung-man government allowed him to create the appearance of a well-informed author in Korean affairs.

Oliver's activities also had a mercantile basis. "In America, together with Goodfellow (an American intelligence officer), Oliver and other friends of mine, I organized a Korean - American company," Lee Seung - man said at a press conference. This company is interested in one of the two largest mines in the East, namely the Wonsan mines, as well as in purchasing raw silk from Korea. This company claims a monopoly right to invest capital in Korea. In the future, when the Korean government is established, this company will be granted the right to trade between Korea and America, with the consent of the United States."1 When R. Oliver took over the Washington bureau of the Korean Pacific Press in 1947 and became editor of the monthly Korean Review, he was offered new opportunities. It was then that various kinds of legends and false statements began to appear. "Why did the war come to Korea?"2-this is what Robert Oliver called his next book dedicated to the events of 1950 and designed, no matter how hard it takes, to justify the US Far Eastern policy.

So why did the war come to Korea? To blame, said an American friend, Lee Seung-man, for the" aggressive policy " of the Soviet Union, which, according to him, even during the Second World War allegedly posed a threat to Korea. For the "proof" R. Oliver gave various examples in his book-

1 "Zago sinmun", 28. V. 1946. Quoted by: "Lee Seung Man's clique is the sworn enemy of the Korean people." Pyongyang, 1952, p. 8.

2 R. T. Oliver. Why War Came in Korea? N. Y. 1930.

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The same kind of fabrications that roamed the pages of the American press at that time and attributed "expansionist aspirations"to the Soviet Union .3 So gradually, through the joint efforts of political intriguers from the pro-American circles of the South Korean ruling elite and their friends in the United States, in order to please direct anti-communist propaganda, a version was circulated in bourgeois literature, which was later used to distort the true causes of the 1950-1953 war in Korea and attempts to disguise the role of American aggression.

On the eve and during the Second World War, when Korean workers, led by communists, began to create detachments for guerrilla struggle against the Japanese invaders, the patriotic, anti-imperialist Choguk Ewanbokhe society was active. It has identified the creation of a Korean independent democratic State as its primary task. More than one punitive operation was carried out by the Japanese military against the Korean revolutionaries, but its efforts were in vain. In the battles with the Japanese, cadres of brave wrestlers grew up, thousands of Korean patriots went through a difficult combat school.

Lee Seung Man also went through a special school at that difficult time for the Korean people, beating the doorsteps of the US State Department, learning the subtleties of political fraud and mastering lobbying skills. Having finally settled in the United States back in 1912, he begins to build up the backbone of a future group of people loyal to him from among the Korean bourgeois emigration to the United States and in Kuomintang China. In 1919, the "Provisional Government of Korea" was established in Shanghai, with which most of the representatives of the Korean bourgeois emigration linked their fate. Lee Seung Man joined him for personal gain as a "representative" of Koreans living in the United States. The Shanghai (and after the move - Chongqing) "government of Korea", having a diverse social and political composition, limited its functions mainly to the sphere of diplomacy and top-level political contacts. The tacit approval of the Japanese annexation of Korea by the United States condemned the fleeing bourgeois emigrants to a miserable existence and effectively nullified their propaganda activities.

The Japanese attack on the U.S. Navy at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, unleashed the Korean bourgeois emigration to the United States. Four days later, Lee Seung Man addressed the Koreans with a proclamation, in which, among other things, he wrote:: "Your Government, the Provisional Government of Korea, from its headquarters in Chongqing officially declared war on Japan on December 11." This admission in itself was proof of the pro-American orientation of the "Provisional Government", which followed the same US line towards Japan before Pearl Harbor. Now, however, the Korean emigrants who were in the United States first had to fight a protracted, mostly epistolary-style battle with State Department officials. The latter remained indifferent to the requests of Korean emigration. The cold they encountered was not accidental and was not due to subjective factors. The ideas of Korean emigration were, in the opinion of American politicians, in contradiction with the" great diplomacy " of the United States. The Changkaish government, which clearly had an increased interest in Korea and was controlling Lee Seung Man's actions at the time, was categorically "no" to requests to recognize the "Provisional Government of Korea". Assistant Secretary of State Berle explained to the Chinese Ambassador in early 1942 that recognition was impossible, because such a move could lead to increased demands from identical groups acting on behalf of other countries .4 But what most unnerved Lee Seung Man was that he could not help but be annoyed to hear some officials refer to the need to coordinate such acts with their military ally, the USSR, 5 and accuse State Department officials of "communism" and "opportunism." Dr. Lee, however, did not give up trying. He writes a provocative letter to F. D. Roosevelt: "Starting with Pearl-

3 Ibid., p. IX.

4 См. "Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1943". Vol. III. The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East. Washington. 1963, p. 1092.

5 R. T. Oliver. Syngman Rhee - the Man behind the Myth. N. Y. 1955, p. 178.

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For a year and a half, we asked the State Department to recognize the Provisional Government of Korea , the oldest government in exile... Now we have information confirming the goals of Russia seeking to establish its control in Korea. " 6
At that time, the whole world was living on hopes of salvation from the Fascist danger, and these hopes were primarily associated with the victories of the Red Army. After the battle of Stalingrad, the Soviet Union's prestige on the world stage increased dramatically. This was what infuriated the reaction. Opponents of realism in foreign policy were ready to use any fakes to discredit the noble ideas of the anti-fascist coalition. The yellow press of Hearst, Patterson, and McCormick trumpeted a lot about the Soviet Union's "claims" to the countries that were supposed to be freed from the yoke of German-Italian fascism, Japanese militarism, and their allies. There were also forces in the United States willing to use Lee Seung Man with his ideas. They created advertisements for the leader of the Korean reactionary emigration, and provided him and his family with information.to the accomplices of the tribune. Lee Seung Man rode the wave of anti-Soviet aspirations of the American reaction and, in turn, lived up to the hopes of the latter. He decided to openly appeal to American public opinion. "At the present time," said Dr. Lee, speaking in Washington in July 1943, "we have information indicating that the U.S.S.R. intends to establish a Soviet republic in Korea." 7 Such slander was referred to by the Lisynmans as "irrefutable facts" based on information from "reliable sources". However, attempts to influence the President of the Russian Federation. Roosevelt's attempts to gain recognition of the "Provisional Government of Korea" by insistent reminders of the "Russian danger" were not successful at that time. Life itself forced American politicians to ignore the harassment of Lisynman members, because, first, Washington had to take into account the activities of the states that were part of the anti-fascist coalition, and not make unilateral decisions, and secondly, they were afraid that recognition of the" Provisional Government of Korea " would be recognition, even in the future. in a declarative form, the right of colonial Korea to independence. And this, in turn, did not correspond to the general class interests of the Western ruling circles associated with the fate of colonial empires.

The U.S., British, and Chinese decisions on Korea of 1943 (published on December 1) assumed recognition of Korean independence after the war "in due course." Various conjectures and conjectures were expressed in the press regarding the last clause. Lee Seung-man saw the main danger in this kind of wording not in the fact that the document did not specifically mention the period during which Korea would acquire the status of an independent state, but in the possible strengthening of the Soviet Union's influence on the post-war solution of the Korean problem. Therefore, the anti-Soviet orientation of his propaganda has sharply increased. This aspect of Lee Seung Man's work has had a new success among extremist, anti-Soviet circles in the United States. It also appealed to American intelligence. The staff of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) pinned their hopes on Lee and his entourage, and as the future showed, they were not mistaken in their calculations. Lee Seung-man and his colleagues prepared accurate materials for American intelligence about the Korean emigration, its leaders, and their plans for post-war rule in Korea. The closer the end of World War II was, the more valuable Lee Seung Man's efforts seemed to the OSS. Lee's collaboration with intelligence resulted in the publication of Korea and the Pacific War in 1943. Initially, Korean expats submitted this material as a report to the OSS. It noted, in particular, that " there are two Korean divisions in the Soviet Far Eastern army...". This latest attack, made in the hope of playing on anti-Soviet sentiments, angered some American Korean specialists: "The number of Korean population in the Soviet Union is about 200 thousand people; keeping 50 thousand Koreans under arms is clearly not the real thing; there is no truth in the fact that there are soldiers in the Soviet Army.

6 "Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1943". Vol. Ill, pp. 1093 - 1094.

7 Pravda, 13. III. 1946.

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two Korean divisions " 8 . But reactionary circles were quick to note the efforts of Lee and the company.

The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not become, contrary to the hopes of the American reaction, the decisive moment that determined the unconditional surrender of Japan. The Japanese government pinned its hopes on the creation of a powerful defensive fist in China and Korea. From January 1945, plans were made to prepare positions for the "defense of the Asian mainland", with the main focus being on Northeast China and Korea, where the largest groups of Japanese troops were concentrated .9 "Northern China, Manchukuo, and Korea, with their heavy industry," the Japanese command representatives confirmed, "are of great importance for the continuation of the war and are the main core where the imperial army will win the victory." 10 The entry of the Soviet Union into military operations in the Far East and the defeat of the Kwantung Army decided the outcome of World War II in this theater as well. The great merit of the Soviet Armed Forces, in particular, is that they" provided direct practical assistance to the Chinese and Korean peoples in the struggle for independence and freedom.

Korean workers, inspired by the liberation from the Japanese yoke, united in a broad, mass movement for the creation of a sovereign democratic state. Under the leadership of the Communists who came out of the underground, people's committees were created to express the will of the working people of Korea; various political parties, public organizations, and trade unions were formed. The commander of the American armed forces in the Far East, MacArthur, who acted in agreement with the new Japanese government cabinet, did a lot to keep the Japanese colonial administration in South Korea until the appearance of American occupation troops on Korean territory. The head of the US military administration announced his intention to rule the country with the help of Japanese officials, including Governor-General Abe Nobuyuki. MacArthur's proclamations of September 7, 1945 (No. 1 and No. 2), dropped from airplanes on the territory of South Korea, declared the need to preserve the Japanese colonial apparatus until a certain time and provided for the right to apply any punishment for any speech against the American armed forces. "Military governorship implies no major changes to the system of civilian government established by the Japanese," said a report on Korea submitted from MacArthur's headquarters in October 1945.11

On October 16, 1945, an American transport plane landed at Gimpo Airport, 15 miles from Seoul. A middle-aged man was coming down the gangplank, trying to impress others and trying to give his whole appearance a look of sedateness and cheerfulness. Lee Seung Man, who has lived in the United States for 35 years, has set foot on Korean soil again. General MacArthur, Commander of the US Far East, expressed a personal interest in Dr. Lee's return, approved of his plans, and placed a plane at his disposal. Now Lee, addressing the audience in what witnesses described as "a Hawaiian dialect of Korean jargon," warned those who met him that he had returned to Korea as a "private citizen." The commander of the US armed forces in South Korea, General Hodge, hastily organized a rally in front of the Seoul Capitol building in honor of the arriving "wanderer". No sooner had the eulogies died down than the "private citizen" began a feverish activity that inextricably combined his personal interests with the wishes of the leading political groups in the United States and the Korean reaction.

Lee's appearance in South Korea was accompanied by a State Department statement.. Members of the press have learned that the military administration in South Korea has begun recruiting Koreans "according to their abilities" as advisers on the country's internal affairs .12 It didn't seem like much at the time

8 "Pacific Affairs", vol. XVII. 1944, N 2, p. 236.

9 "Army Operation in China, January 1944 -August 1945", Headquarters USAFFE and Eighth U. S. Army. N72, 12.X.1945, "p. 180.

10 Archive of Foreign Policy (WUA) of the USSR, f. 100, p. 179, l. 248.

11 G. Henderson. Korea. The Politics of the Vortex. Cambridge. 1968, p. 160.

12 "Department of State Bulletin", 1945, October, p. 643.

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This remarkable event marked the beginning of the demagogic arguments of American propaganda about the" special liberation mission "of the United States, whose troops came to Korea solely to help the" unprepared " people for independence to learn and implement in practice the best example of democracy - the American one. By the time Dr. Lee arrived in Seoul, Koreans could see how far this discussion of democracy was from the true state of affairs. The occupation forces have already done a solid job of suppressing the democratic movement in the country. People's committees were broken up (they were created after the liberation all over Korea). The American administration, using the apparatus of the Japanese police, tried to create an atmosphere of intolerance around progressive figures. Honest Democrats were hit by a wave of repression. Published just as Lee arrived in Korea, the New York Post reported on South Korea's overcrowded prisons. As a result of the "undeclared war of right-wing circles and the police against left-wing elements," the newspaper said, up to 20 thousand prisoners ended up in 18 prisons and 5 camps. In September, General Hodge shut down three left-wing newspapers and arrested many Communist Party leaders .13 Repression alone, of course, could not guarantee reactionary political stability. It was necessary, as Washington believed, to mobilize forces that had social support in Korea and were friendly to the United States. To this end, the US administration has given its protégé every opportunity to show his abilities.

A week after arriving in Seoul, Lee Seung Man took the chairman's gavel in his hands at a meeting attended by up to 2,000 representatives of various political groups. Two days later, the Central Committee of the Society for the Speedy Achievement of Independence began to act, bringing together fragments of various political factions of the bourgeoisie, officials and landowners who had fled from the North and harbored hatred for the fighters for the new Korea. Lee Seung Man also became the head of this organization. Li noted the beginning of his activity as the head of the Society with the phrase: "I will take over the leadership of the Society and put it only on a democratic basis." Further deciphering the meaning of the term "democracy", he stated: "I will appoint all other officials"14 . At first, the committee managed, albeit temporarily, to unite the right-wing political parties. On his behalf, there was a call for the "Provisional Government of Korea" to immediately come from China to their homeland 15 . Lee, relying on the military administration, carefully sifted through the returnees who arrived in Korea. The FBI also had a hand in this case. The American Okhrana was very particular about the choice of people from the Korean emigration who were heading home. Koreans who had even once spoken out against Lee Seung Man were subjected to particularly thorough treatment.

At the same time, heavy American transport planes brought Lee's associates to Korea. On November 4, 1945, a group of Koreans arrived from the United States, calling themselves representatives of the" Provisional Government of Korea " in the United States. The next day, more than 30 leaders of the same "government", after listening to the edifying speech of Chiang Kai-shek, also went to Seoul. All of them, it was noted in the official press of the United States, were " carriers of democratic ideals." However, the United States immediately began to rely on wealthy Koreans, mostly those who spoke English or Japanese, as the Americans themselves admitted .16 On November 23, the head of the "Provisional Government of Korea" Kim Koo arrived in Seoul. He spent many years in China, became famous for organizing and carrying out a number of attempts on major Japanese dignitaries, gained fame as a terrorist and fighter against Japanese colonialists. After his return, Kim Koo decided to try to unite the forces of Koreans who opposed the Japanese yoke on a nationalist basis...

The Moscow conference of representatives of the USSR, Britain and the United States (December 1945) adopted agreed decisions on the future of the Korean State, which provided, in particular, for the guardianship of the leading powers, carried out through the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea.

13 Soon Sung Cho. Korea in World Politics, 1940 - 1950. Berkeley. 1967, p. 133.

14 "Harper's Magazine", 1954, February, p. 31.

15 Soon Sung Cho. Op. cit., p. 77.

16 H. M. Vinacke. A History of the Far East in Moderr Times N. Y., 1959, p. 706.

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the Korean government. So, first of all, the creation of an all-Korean Provisional democratic Government; then, with the participation of this government, the development by a joint Soviet - American commission of measures for the implementation of guardianship for the creation of a unified and independent Korean state. These were the allied decisions. This was the United States ' tribute to the general democratic, peace-loving mood around the world. The Korean problem, like many other problems of great international importance, seemed to have to be resolved in the spirit of the liberation ideas of the time that had taken hold of the peoples of the world after the great victories of the Soviet Army over the forces of fascism.

But Moscow's decisions were a watershed dividing political forces in Korea. The "Democratic Chamber", which united the reactionary forces through the efforts of Lee and his supporters, led the fight against the Moscow decisions. Opponents of the December meeting in Moscow pursued various goals. Some, grouped around Kim Koo, tried to remove all obstacles to the recognition of the former Chongqing "government of Korea"17 . Others, who feared for the fate of their fortunes, even during the years of Japanese rule relied on Lee Seung Man. The Lisynman reaction has once again brought to light old fakes intended to discredit Soviet Union policy and Moscow's decisions on Korea.

At that time, some actions of the US administration in Korea were still being taken under the influence of the pressure of progressive forces. Washington was aware that it was impossible to solve the Korean problem without the Soviet Union, and therefore they tried to limit the participation of the Soviet side to the framework of discussions in the Soviet-American Commission, and in the meantime, behind the scenes, they provoked the actions of the Lisynman people. The reaction went on the offensive. Conservatives of various stripes, who have taken over the South Korean press, first of all tried to instill in Korean public opinion the idea that trusteeship was established at the request of the Soviet Union, and Moscow, they say, can't wait for the hour when it will be able to "seize the Korean peninsula." Further, anti-Soviet propagandists deliberately opened wounds that had not yet healed, putting an equal sign between guardianship and the Japanese mandate. Naturally, the Soviet side could not pass by such a fake. The statement of the head of the Soviet delegation to the Soviet - American Commission, Colonel-General T. F. Shtykov, in September 1947 was an unexpected surprise for Hodge and threw him into a state of confusion. From this statement, the Koreans learned the whole truth, and it consisted in the fact that the priority in the guardianship proposals belonged not to the USSR, but to the United States, and that the latter did not even provide for the creation of a Korean government in their draft. Only thanks to the insistence of the Soviet side, the term of the preparatory period (guardianship) proposed by the United States was shortened and a decision was made to create a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, with the participation of which it was supposed to achieve the establishment of state independence of the country18 . Hodge, aware of the consequences for the prestige of the United States of exposing fakes fabricated by" friends "of the United States in the person of representatives of the "Democratic House", fell into a frenzy and attacked the State Department: he turned to diplomats for support and begged them to somehow neutralize the effect of the Soviet statement.

The State Department responded to Hodge's alarmed calls by saying that custody was seen in the United States as a means to shield Korea from Soviet influence .19 This report, however, did not reflect even approximately the true state of affairs. There were recommendations from the State Department to the US president dating back to the Second World War, which insisted on the implementation of trusteeship in post - war Korea, and "the representation of other states,"it noted," should not be so significant that it could harm American participation in the occupation. " 20 Hodge, left without arguments and not knowing what he should do, went to the door.-

17 In March 1947, this group attempted to declare itself a de jure Government. The Khoj military Administration disavowed this action (Soon Sung Cho. Op. cit, p. 135).

18 " The Soviet Union and the Korean Question (documents)", Moscow, 1948, pp. 58-59.

19 Soon Sung Cho. Op. cit, pp. 108 - 109.

20 "Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conferences of Malta and Yalta. 1945". Washington. 1955, pp. 359 - 360.

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I sent MacArthur a message complaining about weak leadership on the part of Washington. After all, Shtykov's statement, he wrote, opened the eyes of everyone who harbored illusions about the line of the Americans, and the Koreans came to the conclusion that the United States was a traitor. Hodge offered himself, if it would benefit the prestige of the United States, as a "scapegoat", believing that his resignation would save the day. And if he continued to operate in Korea, he insisted on providing other information about American politics.

Meanwhile, while Hodge cursed the diplomats, American monopolies were taking over the South Korean economy. Before the liberation, 91% of all capital investments in the Korean economy belonged to the Japanese colonialists (in industry-94%, in banking-99%). After the occupation of South Korea, the United States controlled 24 industries (80% of the entire South Korean economy)21 . Lee Seung Man was especially in a hurry. He signed one agreement after another, through which the gold mines and coal mines passed into the hands of overseas businessmen. American capital dominated or took full ownership of Great Electric Co., Great Korea Oil Tanker Co., Far Eastern Import & Export Co., and many others. The monopolies of the United States were given the undivided right to determine the price of coal and oil, and to export and distribute these raw materials. So the American idea of the guardianship system acquired the material base for which it originated.

On September 26, 1947, at a meeting of the joint Soviet-American commission on Korea, the Soviet delegation proposed withdrawing Soviet and American troops from the entire country in early 1948 and giving the Korean people the opportunity to decide their own affairs .22 This Soviet proposal came as a complete surprise to the United States and right-wing groups in South Korea. For a long time, Lee Seung-man and the political forces behind him advertised their own desire to "unite" Korea by their own means, in addition to implementing the decisions of the Moscow Conference and without any support from foreign troops. And now that the Soviet Union has put forward an unequivocal proposal, they have fallen into a state of confusion that is even more pronounced in connection with the activities of the people's government in the north of the country.

The idea of the Provisional People's Committee of North Korea to create a national government based on the broad participation of democratic parties and public organizations that support the Moscow decisions of the three foreign ministers has received a warm response throughout the country. At a conference of representatives of the United National Democratic Front parties in June 1947, a program was discussed that reflected the urgent needs of the Korean people: the confiscation of land owned by landlords and Japanese colonialists and its transfer to the peasants; the nationalization of industrial enterprises, transport, communications and banks previously owned by the Japanese and those who collaborated with them. an enemy. It was also planned to take measures to protect small-scale private enterprise activities23 . Naturally, the implementation of such a program would block the path of the bourgeoisie and landlords to power and put an end to Lisynman's demagogy. The USSR declared its full support for the Provisional Committee's plan, and a survey conducted by the Korean Public Opinion Association showed that 57% of people surveyed in South Korea supported these ideas, despite persecution by Lisynman agents. 24

The ruling elite in Seoul began to realize their helplessness in the face of the peace-loving actions of the USSR and democratic transformations in the north of the country. So she decided to oppose the withdrawal of American troops and try to compromise the Soviet proposals. The "Father of the Korean Nation" found not only mutual understanding, but also active support in the United States. On the pages of the New York Herald Tribune, another propaganda fake was relished, which then migrated to other publications, regarding some fantastic plans of the commune-

21 W. G. Burchett. Again Korea. N. Y. 1968, p. 110.

22 " The Soviet Union and the Korean Question (documents)", pp. 61-62.

23 "Pravda", 20. VI. 1947.

24 Suon Sung Cho. Op. cit., p. 174.

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stov 25 . Having disrupted the work of the joint Soviet-American commission, the United States abandoned its obligations under the Moscow meeting of December 1945 and pushed a resolution to the UN on the establishment of an Interim UN Commission on Korea. This commission was supposed to create a screen behind which all political machinations to organize a pro-American government in Korea would be carried out. Democratic parties and organizations called for a boycott of separate elections in South Korea, rightly seeing this as a threat to the dismemberment of the country. The Democratic People's Front of South Korea, despite the terror and severe persecution, launched a struggle to remove the UN Commission and foreign troops. On April 14, 1948, the North Korean political parties and organizations called for a joint meeting with the South Korean parties to prevent the dismemberment of the country. At the joint meeting in Pyongyang, held from 19 to 30 April 1948, 395 of the 695 participants were from South Korea .

The movement for the creation of a single democratic state has caused a new wave of terror in the South. The American military police, together with the gangs of lisynmanovtsy, attacked the participants of the popular movement 27 . Participants in the general strike of protest, which was attended by more than a million people, were arrested and harassed. Then the punishers drowned in blood an armed uprising of workers on the island of Chechudo. Leaning on the American occupation authorities, the Lisynmans were "preparing" for separate elections in South Korea. The US military administration sharply rejected the public's demand to keep collaborators out of the ballot box. For a long time, anti-Japanese propaganda served Dr. Lee as a proven tool for increasing his political weight. Even now, the hard-core politician did not part with his favorite weapon when he needed to play on the anti-Japanese sentiment in the Korean people, who had drunk to the dregs the bitter cup of the colonial oppression of Japanese imperialism. When it came to painful memories of the Japanese protectorate, the South Korean president was particularly loquacious.

Senior positions in the South Korean police were taken over by people who actively helped the Japanese at one time. Ardent collaborators also became the mainstay of the American creation. The leader of the Hanguk Democratic Party, which won the majority of seats in the National Assembly and was Lee's mainstay, was such an odious figure as Kim Sung-soo. Brothers Kim Sung-soo and Kim Yong-soo were the "textile kings" of Korea. They invested their capital not only in the textile industry, but also in publishing, were directors of the Hwasin kerosene company, etc. Kim Sung-soo, who graduated from the Political and Economic Department of Tokyo Waseda University during World War II, devoted himself entirely to cooperation with the colonialists. His merits were appreciated, and he became a member of the Central Council of the Japanese General Government in Korea. American intelligence immediately drew attention to its " capabilities." There were still battles in the Pacific, and the US Strategic Services Office had already included Kim Sung-soo in the lists of persons who were supposed to be used in American interests after the war. And so he took the place of honor 28 among twenty other similar individuals - reactionaries and enemies of the working people.

Kim's loyal accomplice was the head of the police department of the US military administration, Cho Byung-ok, who had remarkable abilities to transform. The Ph. D. degree Yam received after graduating from Columbia University in the United States did not prevent Cho from actively cooperating with the colonialists. The Japanese included the traitor in the Central Committee of the Society for the Speedy Mobilization of the Nation, created in September 1944. After the surrender of Japan, Cho, the owner of a number of mines in South Korea, began to faithfully serve the new occupiers. He organized

25 See Pravda, 6. X. 1947.

26 F. I. Shabshina. Essays on the Modern History of Korea (1945-1953), Moscow, 1958, pp. 144-145.

27 For more information, see V. M. Mazurov. Creation of an anti-people regime in South Korea (1945-1950). Moscow, 1963, pp. 62-73.

28 "Office of Strategic Services. Research and Analysis Branch". Questions on Korean Politics and Personalities. 1945, May 16, p. 7.

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an extensive police network, in which 53% of the positions were held by those who served the Japanese or came to the country on the recommendation of the American authorities .29 Kim, Cho and others like them opened the way for Lee Seung Manu to power. By December 1947, 20% of the top positions in the South Korean administration were held by people who had performed the same duties under the colonial regime; 83% of the members of the Provisional Legislative Assembly and 79% of judges were previously collaborationists .30
It was May 10, 1948. The US military authorities declared a state of siege. U.S. Navy ships were stationed on raids in Busan and Inchon, and squadrons of planes whizzed over the heads of residents of South Korean cities: the National Assembly elections were underway. Voters were given "complete freedom": they could feel the blows of police batons, military patrols kept order, and the muzzles of machine guns watched from the roofs of polling stations. When Hodge announced the National Assembly of South Korea, he spoke of a forum for "free expression of will, free discussion", but did not forget to add that the US authorities retain the right to "veto" the decisions of this body of "free discussion" 31 . Not a single worker or peasant received a parliamentary mandate as a result. When the National Assembly began to meet on May 31, 1948, its deputies met as old colleagues. 86 seats out of 200 were held by supporters of extreme right-wing political groups-the Hanguk Democratic Party and the Society for Early Independence, led by Lee Seung Man. Nearby were reformers from the Greater Korea Labor League, a reactionary trade union, leaders of youth terrorist organizations, and members of the former Chongqing Provisional Government. Many deputies - former officials who ran firms or landed estates-began their new political careers with established conservative beliefs and an unyielding belief in the power of the propertied class. 39 seats belonged to politicians who had previously received a sinecure from the Japanese in the province. Together with the landlords, they formed the so-called "provincial elite"32 and applauded wildly when a puppet government was formed in South Korea on August 5.

South Korean patriots took up arms against the Lee Seungman regime. An echo of the popular uprising on the island of Jejudo has reverberated across Korea: the rebels disrupted the elections of the separate government of Lee Seung Man there. 4 thousand soldiers of the 14th regiment, located in the port of Yosu, refused to go to Chechudo and shoot at their compatriots. The rebellion of the Josu garrison spread to Sucheon. Some time later, the Daegu garrison rebelled. And despite the fact that the uprisings were drowned in blood by merciless terror, armed resistance to the enemy, which often took the form of a guerrilla movement, continued in South Korea.

The Seoul government directly attributed its well-being to the presence of American troops in the country. According to supporters of Lee, who became president in 1948, a favorable situation was created for the use of foreign bayonets: the "Berlin crisis", artificially caused at that time by the United States and its allies, aggravated the international situation. The Western powers were preparing the conditions for the creation of an anti-socialist military alliance in Europe (the future NATO). Lee Seung-man, playing on the anti-Soviet aspirations of the US ruling circles, immediately demanded the growth of its armed forces and stated that "Americans should first provide guarantees to US interests in Korea, based on moral obligations and, secondly, based on US security interests."33
The South Korean president unleashed the most severe repression on anyone who in any way opposed the presence of American troops in South Korea. From January to October 1948 alone, 136,360 people were arrested. Even in time-

29 " United Nations. First part of the report of the United Nations Interim Commission on Korea, vol. Appendix IX-XII, Supplement No. 9, p. 147.

30 Ibid., p. 507.

31 G. Henderson. Op. cit., p. 153.

32 "A Pattern of Political Development: Korea". Ed. by C I. Eugene Kim. Detroit 1964, pp. 11 - 20.

33 R. C. Allen. Korea's Syngman Rhee. Tokyo. 1960, p. 106,

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During Japanese rule in Korea, the largest prison in Seoul took no more than 3 thousand prisoners into its walls. Now, more than 6 thousand people were languishing in her cells .34 On November 28, 1948, the Lisynman National Assembly adopted a resolution " to request American troops to remain on the territory of South Korea."

But on August 15, 1948, a lavish ceremony was held in Seoul: General MacArthur announced the transfer of power in South Korea to the Korean administration. Lee Seung-man, now President of South Korea, was standing next to MacArthur, posing with some bravado for the bustling press photographers. The striped flag of the United States crept slowly down the mast, giving way to the new flag of the Republic of South Korea. More recently, MacArthur, by raising the Japanese national flag over the Japanese parliament building, "opened the way", as clever staff reporters wrote about him, to a long-term US-Japanese alliance. Now the procedure was repeated. The difference was in scale. The official "transfer of power" ceremony, which flattered the general's ego, did not really change anything, because Lee Seung-man recognized not only the preservation, but also the dominant position of American interests in South Korea.

MacArthur, speaking later that day to a reverent crowd of American officers and Lisynman politicians, issued this message from the podium: "At this hour... the triumph is overshadowed by one of the greatest tragedies of our time - the artificial barrier that divided your country. This barrier must and will be removed. " 35 This unequivocal hint inspired the Lisynmans and gave the bourgeois press an excuse to launch a broad smear campaign against the working people of North Korea. As the situation in Kuomintang China worsened and the democratic movement in Japan grew, MacArthur's dislike of the "liberals" in the State Department, the "Anglophobes" as he often called them, increased. The concept of these individuals at that time was that it was desirable to use, especially in American interests, the ideas of nationalism in the Chinese revolutionary movement. They hoped for the possibility of preserving, even without the use of armed force, the US position in the Far East.

MacArthur, on the other hand, could not think of any other outcome to the Chinese civil war than Chiang Kai-shek's victory. MacArthur's headquarters strongly pushed for the consolidation of pro-American forces. In August 1948, MacArthur met a representative of Chiang Kai-shek Cheng in Tokyo. The latter requested assistance in improving Sino-Japanese relations for the sake of"economic coordination and collective security in Asia." Now, with the establishment of a republic in Seoul, MacArthur had new hopes of joining forces in the fight against the revolutionary movement in Asia, with democracy in Japan and Korea. On October 19, the general, who was in a hurry, sent his private jet to Gimpo Airfield, South Korea, so that Lee Seung-man and Madame Lee could make another visit to Tokyo .36 This was the first post-war official American political probe into the possibility of a rapprochement between Japan and South Korea. "I will defend South Korea," MacArthur solemnly assured Dr. Lee,"just as I will defend my homeland!" 37 But how to protect Lisynman residents from the patriotic movement inside the country? Should we keep American troops in South Korea or arm the South Korean army as best we can? The activities of the American military in South Korea were combined with the active activities of the MacArthur headquarters in Japan, which the United States began to consider a potential ally in the fight against the forces of socialism and national liberation revolutions.

American politicians developed several plans at once. Some people who represented the "European" orientation in the ruling circles of the United States recommended "pressing" the USSR through Europe; others, for example, General Wedemeyer, considered it necessary first of all to save the prestige of the United States in China and, depending on this, to solve the problem of Korea. Secretary of War Forrestal feared that the Koreans

34 "Korean Independence", 21.IX. 1949.

35 J. Gun then The Riddle of McArthur, Japan, Korea and the Far East. N. Y. 1951, p. 169.

36 "The China Monthly". Vol. X. January 1949, N 1, pp. 6 - 8.

37 J. Gunther. Op. cit., p. 168.

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bases will not help the US maintain its preponderance in the Far East 38 . The Joint Chiefs of Staff (General Eisenhower, Admiral Nimitz) repeatedly informed the Secretary of State:"From the point of view of military security, the United States has no interest in maintaining troops and bases on the territory of South Korea." 39 Wedemeyer held similar views. Until recently, he seemed to see no other way to save Chiang Kai-shek than the massive involvement of American troops in the Chinese Civil War. From Korea, on the other hand, he considered it expedient to withdraw American troops, sending seven American infantry divisions to Northern China .40 Chiang Kai-shek, in turn, did not hide from the United States his desire to establish Kuomintang control over Korea. Finally, MacArthur unexpectedly voted for the withdrawal of American troops from Korea .41
Meanwhile, the sad fate of the Kuomintang, which was defeated during the Chinese civil war, worried Lee Seung Man, who feared the same outcome for himself, and he openly went to aggravate the situation in the country, without ceasing to turn to the bugaboo of anti-Sovietism. His personal representative in the United States, Cho Byung-ok, knocked on all the doors, complaining about the" weakness " of the South Korean army. Such statements were in line with the interests of reactionary circles in American society, who saw support for the Lee Seungman regime as a way to fulfill the main task - to resist the unification of Korea on a democratic basis. At the same time, American failures in China prompted State Department officials to monitor the prestige of the South Korean regime. On June 2, 1949, Butterworths, the head of the State Department's Far East division, summoned the South Korean ambassador, Chang Meng, and cautiously told him that the dissemination of incorrect information by South Korean leaders about the state of their armed forces was harmful; Cho Byung Ok "was conducting false propaganda, namely: according to him, only 30,000 Koreans are armed... Despite the fact that there are currently more than 70,000 soldiers in Korea, more than 50,000 police officers and more than 5,000 Coast Guard personnel are appropriately armed. " 42
The establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 1948 was an important factor in peace and security in the Far East. The DPRK was immediately recognized by all socialist countries. The workers of the DPRK, relying on the fraternal help of the USSR, in the difficult conditions of the artificial division of the country, began to strengthen the new social and state system, establish socialist production, and strengthen their armed forces, which are capable of responding to any provocations of the American military and the Lisynman people. North Korea's success has infuriated reactions in the United States and its allies in Seoul. The latter, in order to force the events, intensified provocations in the area of the 38th parallel. From January to September 1949, there were 432 attacks on the DPRK across its land border; numerous raids on the DPRK and from the sea took place; and the air border was violated. 43 As a result, the population of the areas adjacent to the southern border of the DPRK was forced to endure severe hardships, paying numerous victims for the adventures of the Lisynman military. Many senior US army officials have made no secret of the fact that the South Korean government deliberately invents border incidents in order to quickly enlist American "help." 44In the middle of the summer of 1949, when disputes broke out in the Washington Capitol over how best to support the South Korean regime, lisynmanovtsy conducted reconnaissance in battle at the 38th parallel, but, having met with a worthy rebuff,they went home.

The Lisynman administration considered it extremely important for itself to urgently resolve domestic political problems. be with the opposition, which reflected, even to a small extent, the democratic mood in the South Korean community-

38 "New York Times", 3.XI.1952.

39 D. Rees. Korea: the Limited War. L. 1964, p. 14.

40 T. Hig gins. Korea and the Fall of Macarthur. N. Y. 1960, p. 5.

41 R. Sawyer. Military Advisers in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War. Washington. 1962. p. 37.

42 " The facts tell." Pyongyang, 1960, pp. 184-185.

43 "A Chronicle of Principal Events relating to the Korean Question 1945 - 1954". 1954, p. 23.

44 "The China Weekly Review", 2.VII.1949.

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stve? How can the United States expand its military assistance? The opposition pointed out serious contradictions that were tearing apart the Lisyunman elite. The latter, in an inevitable tribute to anti-colonial sentiments in South Korea, engaged in anti-Japanese demagoguery, and at the same time, feeling powerless in the face of the popular movement and frightened by the defeats of Chiang Kai-shek, appealed for help to the same collaborators and relied on the police and most of the top officials, whom the people hated because they collaborated with Japanese people. Back in August 1948, the National Assembly passed the law "On National Traitors", which provided for the punishment of persons who collaborated with the invaders. The law was supported by relatively young representatives of the nationalist wing of the National Assembly. After the adoption of the law, the Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry of the Lishnman government immediately resigned. Punishments seemed to be expected for many influential Koreans who held positions of authority .45 Patriotic organizations have put forward the slogan of fighting national traitors. Korean patriots who were in exile in the United States also spoke out against Lee Seung Man and his social support.

"Didn't Lee Seung Man become a fierce defender of the enemies of the Korean people who beat up Korean collaborators and national traitors? -asked the readers of the Los Angeles-based newspaper Korean Independence. "Wasn't he the one who formed his government out of the enemies of the Korean people who became his mainstay?! Wasn't it Lee Seung Man who, with the help of this treacherous, separate government, made anti-people "treaties"with the US government: 1) the so-called "US-Korean military agreement" and 2) the so-called "US-Korean financial transfer agreement"? Wasn't it Lee Seung-man who was the loudest advocate in 1945 and 1946 for the immediate withdrawal of American and Soviet troops from Korean territory, and then, as president of the US-backed puppet government, begged the US to leave American troops in Korea indefinitely, while the Soviets withdrew completely from Korea by December 25, 1948 a year? " 46 .

A special committee of the South Korean National Assembly investigated the activities of national traitors who collaborated with the Japanese colonialists. The Committee members urged the Government to implement the law on national criminals in practice. The enterprising organization, taking advantage of the strong anti-Japanese sentiment among Koreans, established its own courts, its own investigative apparatus, armed police, and even prisons, which allowed it to launch activities against individuals who occupied lucrative positions in the highest state police bodies. From January to June 1949, the "special police" almost daily arrested and put on trial prominent police officials who had previously tarnished their biography by cooperating with the invaders .47 According to the Lisynman people, the parliamentarians went to the point of" insanity", demanding more freedom than was allowed by the Lisynman code of rules. And when March 18, 1919 (JJ members of the National Assembly signed a letter to the UN Commission demanding the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, and Dr. Lee decided that the time had come to act. His associates hurriedly prepared a series of charges of "communist conspiracy", " subversive activities;), etc. At the end of May, a number of deputies of the National Assembly were arrested on charges of "sympathizing with communism". Newspapers and magazines were shut down without any serious explanation. When asked why the biggest newspaper in the country, Seoul Sinmun, was shut down, unflappable officials replied);: the newspaper has only published 40% of government material in the past four months. The total was quite enough to accuse the editorial office of anti-government activities 48 .

One day in June 1949, a cavalcade of Jeeps surrounded the Special Committee of the National Assembly to Investigate the activities of National Traitors. Sixty heavily armed police officers defused the guards and stormed into the building.

45 G. Henderson. Op. cit., pp. 236 - 257.

46 "Korean Independence", 20.1 V. 1949.

47 G. Henderson. Op. cit., pp. 2SG-257.

48 "Times", 20.VI.1949.

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building. They methodically and coolly smashed office equipment, broke cabinets, scrupulously raked documents, and arrested employees. When the chairman of the committee tried to object to the police's outburst, he received an unanswerable response: "We are doing this on Lee Seung Man's personal orders." On June 29, a certain lieutenant in the South Korean army (as they said), a member of the "independence Party", obtained an audience with Kim Koo. When he entered his office, he fired four shots at point-blank range at an old terrorist who had used similar methods more than once in his life. And after a while, the president of South Korea was already standing in front of the microphone and demonstrating an example of hypocrisy. "I was very moved," he said, his voice breaking, " by the news of Kim Koo - Baek Bom's murder. It is necessary to strictly interrogate the killer and find out for what purpose he committed the murder and with whom he was connected, and then publish the detailed results of the investigation and severely punish the criminal. I resent the fact that Koreans do such things. If there are public or personal accounts, then they must be resolved by law... The murder of Kim Koo is a great loss for the nation." In addition to showing indignation, however, it was necessary to show that they were not involved in the murder, because even outside of Korea, the long-standing disputes between Lee Seung Man and Kim Koo were well known. "Recently," the speaker decided to recall in this connection, " there have been differences in political views between us, which has sown some doubts and conversations in political circles. But I was sure that sooner or later Kim Koo would understand me, understand that my opinion corresponds to the only way in the grand plan of building the republic. I was very happy that recently he was gradually beginning to understand me, but unfortunately, an accident happened to him. " 49
On July 2, the military police arrested the editor of the Seoul Daily because the latter dared to publish a report by leading figures of the Independence Party. The authors of the report understood that the" misfortune " that overtook Kim Koo could befall each of them at any time, and therefore published material exposing the Lisynman police. Kim Koo's killer, meanwhile, was kept locked up under tight security, not allowing any communication with the outside world. Lee defended himself: "The facts will show that Kim Koo's death is a direct result of differences of opinion in his own party." But a few years passed, and the lieutenant who received a life sentence for Kim's murder on trial became a colonel in the South Korean army .50 This is how Dr. Lee dealt with the opposition. He quickly buried the entire system of combating national traitors and destroyed all the evidence painstakingly collected by the committee on collaborationist affairs. The day after the committee was defeated, protests broke out. It became known that people arrested as a result of the raid are subjected to torture. Under public pressure, the police released 22 people. 16 of them were released with signs of severe torture 51 .

Expatriate Lisynmans preferred to rely on ardent collaborators and created a state in accordance with their ideals acquired in the emigrant basements of the United States. At the forefront of their activities against the Democrats was the accusation of the latter in "communism". "Anti-communism has always been much more fragile than the grass roof of a Korean hut," some sensible people reminded Seoul, but to no avail. Lee Seung Man, feeling the pressure of the Cold War supporters and the support of the local reaction behind him, has thoroughly mastered the bogeyman of anti-communism. He constantly turned to anti-communist demagoguery to slander another victim. So many Koreans died who had no idea about communism, but only allowed themselves to disagree with Lee's dictates.

In Tokyo, where Douglas MacArthur, the most prominent representative of the Asia First group in the US Congress, was in charge, supporters of "decisive action" gathered to stop the crisis of the Changkaish and South Korean regimes. At the end of October 1949, the head of the Seoul mission in Japan presented-

49 Yonghak Sinmun, 28. VI. I949.

50 R. C. Allen. Korea's Syngman Rhee. Tokyo. 1960, pp. 110 - 111.

"Compilation 51 of Certain Published Information on the Military Situation in the Far East". Washington. 1951, p. 157.

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He was assigned to Sebolt, a diplomatic adviser at MacArthur's headquarters, by the South Korean Defense Minister Shin Sung-mo. "We are strong enough,"he boasted to reporters," to launch a campaign and take Pyongyang in a few days." Brigadier General William Roberts, the head of the US military advisory group in South Korea, was equally confident when he visited Tokyo with Lee Seungman's minister. Roberts, having lost all sense of proportion, talked narcissistically about the South Korean army: "My army!", " My forces!". Roberts ' special position allowed him to make statements. His group of military advisers (CMAG), although officially under the control of the American ambassador in Seoul, preferred to operate independently or in concert with MacArthur's headquarters. KIM's representatives regularly showed up in Tokyo to discuss political issues and inform MacArthur's people about the situation in South Korea .52
Roberts, who prided himself on his "independence," insisted on the possibility of "crushing" North Korea if necessary .53 But Lee Seung-man surpassed everyone in bragging rights. On September 30, 1949, he decided to share his thoughts with Robert Oliver. "I am firmly convinced," he wrote to an American friend and adviser, " that now is the psychologically most appropriate time to take aggressive measures and join forces with the Communist army loyal to us in the North in order to eliminate the rest of it in Pyongyang. We will push some of Kim Il Sung's men into the mountainous region and gradually starve them to death. Then our defense line will be strengthened along the Tumyn and Yalu rivers. Our situation will improve 100 percent... Please state all this in a very convincing statement, carefully get in touch with influencers and ensure their support. If you could communicate all of the above to President Truman, I think it would have some success. " 54
Oliver, South Korean Ambassador Jang Meng, and Seoul's UN representative Cho Byung Ok discussed Lee's proposals, but agreed that the time for such a project has not come, and that international public opinion has not yet been prepared. The plan, they shared with Lee, "should be implemented when we are ready and when the time is right." On October 7, 1949, Lee Seung-man gave an interview to Joseph Johnson, vice president of the United Press agency, without waiting for a response from Oliver. The next day, the interview was published in Seoul newspapers. The catchy headline was alarming: "The North Koreans have asked me, "Lee said," to radio the Koreans loyal in the North to call for the overthrow of the communist regime, and they expect us to join them. I firmly believe that we can occupy Pyongyang in three days. It is much easier to defend our country on the borders of Manchuria and Korea than on the 38th parallel. What are the reasons, regardless, that keep me from going public? This is because the United Nations and the United States are paying attention to the danger of such actions turning into a Third World War. This is the reason for our patience and waiting for the moment when the problems of communism will be solved in parallel with other problems. " 55 And what should the people of South Korea expect in the new year, 1950? And to this question, in his New Year's message, Lee decided to give an answer: "We must remember...that in the new year, it will be our duty to unite North and South Korea by our own efforts in accordance with the new international environment."56
The year 1950 dawned. "I was horrified," the South Korean president told reporters on January 7, " when I received a message that the British government recognized the PRC... After all, last year Britain joined other democratic countries in NATO! " No, he concluded, "communism cannot be encouraged in Asia." 57 But the announcement of the recognition of the PRC by Britain was followed by another, no less frightening news for Li. On the morning of January 13, 1950, in the wards of

52 R. K. Sawyer. Op. cit., p. 47.

53 W. T. Sebоll, R. Brines. With McArthur in Japan. L. 1967, p. 182.

54 "Facts say", pp. 32-35.

55 W. G. Burchett. Op. cit., p. 124.

56 Ibid, p. 125.

57 "Joseon Ilbo", 9. I. 1950.

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The National Assembly was in turmoil. Acheson's name was heard wherever the excited deputies crowded. The last statement of the Secretary of State, made the day before and including the thesis about the" perimeter of defense " of the United States, shook the walls of the Seoul Capitol. South Korean parliamentarians, who had dreamed of making a campaign to the North, suddenly fell into confusion. They reread Acheson's statement with the zeal of hypochondriacs and kept asking the same question in surprise: why are South Korea and Taiwan not included in the US "perimeter defense"? It turns out that, in a speech at the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, Acheson stated that "the U.S. defense perimeter extends from the Aleutian Islands through Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, and the Philippines."58 The content of the Secretary of State's speech, of course, was not limited to this. The main thing was the anti-Soviet orientation of his speech, where arguments from the arsenal of leading propagandists of the Asia First group were used to slander the USSR, although his speech was intended to contribute to the success of the" European orientation " in US foreign policy. The Soviet Union's liberation mission during World War II, according to Acheson, "did not exist." At the same time, the speaker tried to present US policy in an extremely favorable light.

The Washington administration, meanwhile, faced with a sharply deteriorating situation in China, was feverishly looking for a way out of the impasse. The" best measure " in Washington's view would be a compromise with the "new regime" in China, which would allow the US to maintain its position in this country. In the United States, a broad campaign was launched to recognize the new government in China (the State Department also joined this campaign). The officials put forward proposals that essentially paved the way for the liberation of Taiwan by the People's Liberation Army. Secretary of State Acheson agreed not to obstruct China's admission to the United Nations and officially announced the United States 'unwillingness to include Taiwan and South Korea in its" defense perimeter. " 59
Lee Seung-man and his supporters were only further fueled by the failure of Washington's diplomatic game in China at the time. They were only temporarily reassured by the agreement with the United States on "mutual security", signed on January 25, 1950. At the same time, an agreement was signed on the status of a group of American advisers in South Korea, who were charged with training Lee Seung Man's armed forces. The policy of using nationalism in the Chinese revolutionary national liberation movement, which was associated with Acheson's name, was not yet directly justified at that time. At that time, the internationalist line prevailed in the national liberation movement of China as a whole. The PRC declared full solidarity with the Soviet Union and its foreign policy. On February 14, 1950, the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the People's Republic of China and a number of other agreements were signed .60 The internationalism that prevailed in the CCP leadership at that time had a depressing effect on the British "appeasers" of the Chinese revolution and their American followers. Soviet specialists are going to China; the Society of Soviet-Chinese Friendship has about "32 million members," the bourgeois press reported with concern .61 Reactionary elements in the US felt that their time had come. On February 20, 1950, McCarthy filed a lawsuit in the Senate over his allegations of" communist " activities at the State Department. The senator, embittered and resentful of his ignorance, aimed the main arrows at specialists from the Far East, who, in his opinion, gave China "into the hands of the Communists." 62
Meanwhile, the climate of anti-communist hysteria in the United States has cheered Dr. Lee up. The South Korean army hastily armed itself with rifles, carbines, machine guns, oru-

58 "Department of State Bulletin", 23.1.1950, pp. 114 - 115.

59 See G. V. Astafyev. Some trends in US policy towards China. "Collection of articles based on the materials of the Scientific Conference on International Relations in the Pacific Ocean basin", Moscow, 1968, p. 27.

60 See Pravda, 15. II. 1950.

61 "Times", 8, 9.VI. 1950.

62 "Senate Comittee on Foreign Relations". Hearings on State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation. 81-st. Cong., 2d Sess., 1950.

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days of American production. At the disposal of the Seoul command were warships and aircraft. The failure of diplomatic intrigues against China has forced the US ruling circles to reconsider their attitude towards South Korea. Additional funds were provided to the Chiang Kai-shek regime, and the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Additional Aid to South Korea Bill on February 9, 1950 .63 On March 15, 1950, Congress finally approved the allocation of $ 10,970,000 to South Korea.

The size of the South Korean army reached 94,808 people by June 1950. By January 1950, 6,145 people were in the Coast Guard, 1,865 in the Air Force, and 48,273 in the police .64 According to the American historian Page, in the summer of 1950 Seoul received a huge amount of military equipment from the United States, the South Korean army increased to 98 thousand people, and the "security forces" - from 114 thousand to 154 thousand people. 65 In the May 1950 elections, Lee Seung-man's party won only 48 seats in the National Assembly, meaning that less than 20% of the President's supporters were elected despite repression .66 Lee, as usual, did not follow the investigative procedures known to him in Washington - important attributes of American "democracy." Without falling into contradiction with the basic dogmas of Confucian morality, he used the right of the strong: another 13 deputies of the National Assembly were put behind prison bars without any explanation. They were charged, among others, with petitioning the United Nations; disclosing information about government corruption; and speaking out against the invasion of North Korea by South Korean forces .67 Now Lee was no longer shy, as he sometimes was before, in terms of expressions when he found another of his "abusers"in the US Senate. When Senator Connally of Texas said no to a question about whether Korea was "an essential part of the U.S. defense strategy," Lee became infuriated. "Connally," he said publicly, "must have forgotten that the United States is bound by its commitments and cannot isolate itself from the situation in Korea if it values its prestige." 68 The Lisynman reaction, directed by the extremist forces of the United States, has intensified its aggressive policy. In 1949 and the first half of 1950, provocations by the Lisynmans along the demarcation line became more frequent. In January-September 1949 alone, more than 400 cases of violations of the demarcation line were registered. 71 times, planes from the south invaded the airspace, and warships constantly violated the territorial waters of the DPRK 69 .

South Korean reaction had high hopes for a visit to Korea by State Department Adviser J. F. Dulles in June 1950. Dulles, as one of the most prominent representatives of the Republican Party in the government, initially openly supported " the Acheson line in Chinese politics. Even despite the pressure of Kuomintang lobbyists, he considered recognition of the PRC government possible. But strong ties to the conservative wing of the Republican Party had the most direct impact on the formation of Dulles ' views, especially during the period of exuberant development of McCarthyism. Proponents of turning the cold war into a hot one also counted on this. On June 10, Dulles was ready to fly to Korea. Before departure, a diplomatic tribute should have been paid to the Seoul Embassy in Washington. Together with his wife, the presidential representative attended a dinner party hosted by Ambassador Chang Meng. Dean Raek, who replaced Butterworths as head of the State Department's Far East division, also arrived there. There were also other officials involved in the trip to Seoul. During lunch, Jang told Dulles how agonizing it had been for Dr. Lee to wait for the momentous moment when the United States would finally firmly declare its full and unconditional support for South Korea "both in peacetime and in the event of conflict, both economically and militarily."-

63 " G. D. Paige. The Korean Decision June 27 - 30. 1950. N. Y. 1968, pp. 35, 70.

64 E. O Ballance. Korea: 1950 - 1953. L. 1969, p. 1266.

65 G. D. Paige. Op. cit., p. 70.

66 W. Lafeber. America, Russia and the Cold War 1945 - 1966. N. Y. 1967, p. 96.

67 "New York Times", 14.III.1950.

68 V. Matsulenko. The Korean War. "Military-historical journal", 1970, N 6, p. 32.

69 I. F. Stone. The Hidden HUory of the Korean War. N. Y. 1952, p. 12.

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armenia " 70 . Dulles assured Chan that he was already preparing a statement of support. Moreover, he has prepared a letter that will be read out on the radio. "In 1938, when I was in the Far East," the president's special representative explained, " the head of the Japanese Information Bureau in Korea invited me to visit your country, but I refused. This time, however, I received a personal invitation from the President of your country and gladly accepted it."

On June 19, Dulles spoke from the rostrum of the National Assembly of South Korea. "The eyes of the free world," he said to the deputies who were frozen in attention, " are turned to you. A compromise with communism would be a path leading to disaster." The United States is ready to "provide the necessary moral and material support to South Korea, which is fighting communism...". "If we cannot defend democracy in the cold war," Lee Seung - man pompously declared in response, " we will win the hot war." It soon became known that Seoul rejected the proposal of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK to unite the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK and the National Assembly of South Korea into a single legislative body and implement the peaceful unification of the motherland. Dulles began his stay in Korea by visiting the 38th Parallel, which General Roberts had long referred to as the" gable, " and posed for a photographer, standing next to an armored train at a distance of one or two miles from the demarcation line and bending over a map that lay on the parapet of the trench. He further asked in detail about the deployment of military units and the location of firing lines. After that, the Seoul press quoted Dulles ' words to the South Korean army. "No opponent," he encouraged his allies, " even the strongest, can stand up to you ...The time is not far off when you will be able to demonstrate your prowess. " 71
On June 20, Dulles spoke at a press conference. "I am sure," he said solemnly, " that Korea will be one of the fighters in the joint struggle... I have heard it said that Korea is alone in the struggle against communist aggression. But in conversations with the Ambassador to Korea, Mucho, Korean statesmen, and members of the National Assembly, it became clear that Korea will never be alone in this struggle." For the eager South Korean politicians and military, such statements meant much more than mere consolation. There were negotiations to be held with MacArthur. Dulles discussed the military situation in the Far East in the presence of Secretary of Defense Jos Johnson and head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar Bradley. By this time, the United States had created a large group of its troops there. In their land forces, located mainly in Japan, there were up to 83 thousand people, 1080 guns and mortars, 495 tanks. The total number of US Air Forces in the Far East zone was 1,172 aircraft, and the Navy included 26 combat and 200 transport ships72. US army units based on the Japanese Islands were already preparing for amphibious operations. The ships of the 7th Fleet were in combat readiness. The strength of aviation at bases in Japan increased. Lisynmanovtsy, in turn, were in a hurry to escalate the situation. The threat of aggression from the south was growing. It was they, the Lisynmans, traitors to the Korean people, as well as the most adventurous circles in the United States that supported and incited them, who bore the main responsibility for the occurrence of the tragic events on Korean soil in June 1950. Professor D. F. Fleming of Vanderbilt University, who, unlike R. Oliver prefers to think sensibly about the events that have taken place, confirmed the aggressiveness of the United States. "We know the sudden outbreak of war on June 25, 1950."it led to three consequences: 1) it put the full power of the United States and the United Nations on the side of the totalitarian government of Lee Seung Man; 2) it threw the forces of the American navy to the defense of Chiang Kai-shek, whose days are numbered; 3) it facilitated the implementation of MacArthur's aspirations, especially in relation to Formosa, and confirmed the thesis that under his leadership there will be "complex problems accessible to political experience" have been solved and will be solved in a way that will provide (Fleming further quotes the words of the General. - V. B.)

70 "Facts say", p. 205.

71 W. G. Burchett. Op. cit., p. 127.

72 V. Matsulenko. Op. ed., p. 33.

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"not only the unification and well-being of your own people, but also the future stability of the Asian continent." 73
President Truman, while vacationing in Missouri, nevertheless met with his top military and civilian advisers. At the first meeting, the president raised the question of the need to use the UN flag in US actions. Before the President returned from his vacation, the UN Secretary-General called and demanded that the Security Council be convened. Before the president lay news from the "UN Commission on Korea", from the US Ambassador in Seoul. Dulles, who had flown from Kyoto to Tokyo, was at MacArthur's with State Department adviser Sebolt. The general, informing them about the progress of the "operation", expressed confidence in the ability of the South Korean army to quickly achieve its goal and stressed the need for the active participation of "powerful US forces"in this matter. Landing craft heavily loaded with American weapons have already moved to the South Korean coast. They were covered by planes that took off from American airfields in Japan. The United States, violating the sovereign right of the Korean people to independence, as recorded in the documents of the conferences of the great Powers and the UN, has committed gross interference in the internal affairs of Korea. The aggressive action against the Korean people marked the beginning of a whole series of adventures that were undertaken at various times on the initiative of the United States against the forces of socialism and the national liberation movement. International imperialism has made yet another unsuccessful attempt to reverse history.

73 D. F. Fleming. The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917 - 1960. Vol. II. 1950 - 1960. N. Y. 1961, p. 600.

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