To the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory

The Journal of Modern History is one of the most famous periodicals in the United States devoted to modern history. The journal is organizationally affiliated with the American Historical Association (AIA). Its pages reflect many new historiographical concepts and theories. The editorial board and the authors of articles in different years included well-known researchers (U. V. Aydelott, R. Palmer, W. McNeil, G. Turner, and others). All this explains the great influence of the journal on the development of bourgeois historiography in the United States.

The journal was founded in 1929 on the initiative of C. P. Higby and his supporters with the aim of bringing together American specialists in European history, stimulating their research, and establishing contacts with European scientists. To guide him, a section of modern European history was created as part of the AIA, with Higby as its first president. This publication is published by the University of Chicago, but the section mentioned above plays a crucial role in developing the problems and orientation of articles (at its annual meetings, editors ' reports are heard, and members of the editorial board are elected).

At the first stages of the journal's existence, the topics and chronological scope of publications were extremely broad: they covered, in addition to European powers, the history of Asian, African and Latin American countries (starting from the XVI century), as well as US foreign policy. Although political and diplomatic subjects were always given priority, articles on economic, social, and" intellectual " history were also published. Currently, the issue of the publication has significantly narrowed. The editorial board accepts articles that relate only to the history of European countries and their foreign policy relations. In recent years, more attention has been paid to sociological problems and historiography.

The Journal of Modern History is published four times a year. Each issue consists of several historical articles, two or three review historiographical articles, and a large number of reviews of published literature. In the 70s, the editorial board introduced a procedure where several general historical articles were printed in full, and the rest "on demand" - as essays, while the reader could receive the full text in the form of microfilm or photocopy. In the early 80's, publications" on demand " were abandoned. The publication of thematic issues devoted to any debatable problems of historical science or the work of major historians is practiced.

The topic of World War II occupies an important place in the journal: from 1946 to 1984, more than 70 articles were published on it. To develop it, as well as to review the literature on this topic, the editors involved well-known American and foreign scientists, including the founders of the concept of "political idealism" S. Bemis and D. Perkins, a major military historian, director of the D. Eisenhower Institute for Historical Research F. Pogue, one of the authors of the " History of the US Army Air Force in the Second World War", D. Keith, one of the leading American theorists on the origin of wars, social Darwinist T. Ropp, researchers of the policy of "appeasement" B. Schmitt and D. Haight, etc.

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The magazine mainly focuses on conservative authors whose concepts are closely related to the political doctrines of the US government. They seek to portray the country's foreign policy in the pre-war years as peaceful and selfless, to belittle the USSR's contribution to the victory in World War II, and to attribute the main role to the United States. 1 . The crisis of the conservative trend and a certain strengthening of the position of liberal-critical historiography in the 60s to some extent affected the journal's activities. Articles by liberal historians began to appear more frequently on its pages, in particular G. Smith's work "The Problem of Equal Pay for equal work in Great Britain during the Second World War" (1981, N 4), dedicated to the struggle of the British proletariat for their rights and exposing the anti-labor policy of the Churchill government. Methodologically, the journal's publications are directed against the Marxist understanding of history. Nevertheless, the articles of conservative historians continued to define the magazine's face. In the second half of the 70s and early 80s, the journal's publications became increasingly reactionary, and the influence of "psychological warfare"was clearly felt. The works of V. Mastni, A. Rezis, R. Stolfi pursue openly propagandistic goals, distort the true role of the Soviet Union in World War II. The approach to choosing topics is also typical. Some of the most important issues received only superficial coverage, and many, such as the goals of the United States in the war, the history of the "second front", the struggle of the USSR for collective security, the Resistance movement, the results of the war, etc., were generally out of the magazine's field of view.

The journal's publications on the history of World War II are grouped in several main areas. Among them, the history of fascism occupies a special place. This topic was developed by representatives of both conservative and moderate - liberal historiography. Some of the articles contained attempts at theoretical generalizations, using the latest concepts of bourgeois science. However, the conclusions of historians of both directions were determined by the same goal: the rehabilitation of capitalist society, which gave rise to fascism and World War II, and the distortion of its true causes. The real essence of fascism as a terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary circles of the monopolistic bourgeoisie, its connection with the general crisis of capitalism, is hushed up, and the real role of bourgeois states (both fascist and Western "democracies") in unleashing the war is hidden.

An example is the article by one of the prominent theorists of "psychohistory", P. Levenberg, "Psychohistory perspectives in the modern history of Germany "(1975, N 2). Under the guise of a" theoretical reinterpretation " of fascism based on an interdisciplinary approach, the author denies any connection between the general development of imperialism in Germany and fascism, declaring the latter an irrational phenomenon that can only be analyzed by means of psychoanalysis. Loewenberg deduces the origins of fascism not from the general crisis of the socio-economic, political, and ideological structure of bourgeois society, not from the desire of monopolies to strengthen their class rule and suppress communist and democratic movements, but from the Freudian psychology of the Germans. Fascism is portrayed by him as the result of "social suppression of natural sexuality", and it appeared as if only because Hitler was able to deftly use some features of national psychology related to the specifics of traditional upbringing in the German family (p .233) .2 The example of Levenberg's article shows that modern psychohistories perform a very specific ideological task. When applied to the theme of fascism, it consists in concealing its real socio-historical roots.

Some authors revive the concept of the alleged opposition of fascism as a regime and ideology to the capitalist system. Such, for example, is the main idea of M. Knox's article "Conquests, external and internal, in fascist Italy and in the West".-

1 For more information about conservative historians, see: Problems of the History of the Second World War, Moscow, 1959; Rzheshevsky O. A. Voina i istoriya, Moscow, 1984; et al.

2 For more information about "psychohistory", see: Salov V. I. Historicism and modern bourgeois Historiography, Moscow, 1977, pp. 109-134.

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Nazi Germany "(1984, No. 1). Rejecting any possibility of explaining the emergence of fascism in these countries by socio-economic factors (an approach he blames on both Marxist and bourgeois-liberal historiography), Knox joins those historians in the West who associate the emergence, ideology, and politics of fascist regimes only with the activities of certain individuals. The fascist movement and its ideology, in his opinion, "were not the expression of the interests of certain classes or groups, but rather the expression of their own interests... first of all, the creations of individuals: Mussolini and Hitler" (p. 5), and the entire foreign and domestic policy of the Axis countries is only an attempt to implement the ideas and beliefs of the "two dictators". Therefore, when analyzing their views and "theories", the author ignores the socio-demagogic nature of fascist programs and slogans (p. 6).

Knox assigns secondary importance to such factors as the economic crisis, the consequences of the Versailles Peace, the nationalism of the German philistine, and the position of the most reactionary part of the industrial circles, the army, the bureaucracy, and the petty bourgeoisie (pp. 29-31). In an effort to obscure the true nature of fascism, to hide its real class character, he uses one of the most reactionary theories of bourgeois historiography, which portrays it as a "revolution". This characterization is opposed even by many bourgeois scientists (D. Mosse, A. Aquarona), who admit that the fascists did not set out to significantly change the economic and social structure of society .3 They completely refute Knox's constructions and the data of Marxist historians, 4 who characterize fascist dictatorships as an extremely reactionary form of state-monopoly capitalism, associated with subordinating the entire domestic and foreign policy of the state to the goal of suppressing the communist and labor movement, unleashing an aggressive war for the redivision of the world.

The liberal researcher E. Neter, author of the article "The Italian Intelligentsia under the rule of fascism" (1971, No. 4), also speaks from a similar position. Describing Mussolini's dictatorship, she asserts that in the early period "fascism was a movement that included many different and sometimes contradictory forces, united by hatred of society and its political structure, which they considered incapable of governing Italy" (p.636). Nether thus presents fascism's hostility to bourgeois democracy as a negation of the entire capitalist system. She claims that the main opponent of fascism and its "regulation of the political, social and economic life of the Italian people" was the intelligentsia (p. 630). In her opinion, the" intellectual resistance " of the liberal intelligentsia to fascism was the decisive factor that led to the collapse of the ideological policy of the Mussolini regime (p.648). Neter reports interesting data on the attitude of various layers of the intelligentsia to the fascist dictatorship, on the activities of opposition organizations and their printed publications. However, by dividing the intelligentsia into groups, depending on their attitude to fascism, it does not reveal the causes of these differences among them. The intelligentsia of Neter appears as a kind of extra-curricular education that has no connections with other social strata of society. Clearly exaggerating the role of the liberal opposition, the author at the same time practically ignores the activities of the most active and consistent anti - fascist organization-the Communist Party of Italy, which led the resistance of the Italian people to the Mussolini dictatorship .5 While it speaks positively of the anti-fascist struggle of individual communist intellectuals, such as A. Gramsci (p.633), it separates their activities from the general front of the Communist Party's struggle. Objectively, the concept of Neter serves to conceal the decisive role of communists and the entire working class in the struggle against fascism.

The views of moderate liberal historians of the United States on the role of fascism in the emergence of World War II, the aggressive policy of the Axis powers, and their claims to world domination are presented in Article X. Herwig's "Prelude to World Peace"

3 Istoriya fascizma v Zapadnoy Evrope [History of Fascism in Western Europe], Moscow, 1978, p.582.

4 See: History of the Second World War. 1939-1945. Tt. 1-2. M. 1973-1974; Galkin A. A. German fascism. M. 1967; Anatomy of war. M. 1971; History of fascism in Western Europe; etc.

5 History of fascism in Western Europe, pp. 95, 97, 115-116.

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a blitzkrieg. German Naval Policy towards the United States "(1971, No. 4). This article, which examines the plans for the conquest of world domination by fascist Germany and Hitler's policy towards the United States, reflects the contradictory concepts of bourgeois historiography. On the one hand, the author polemics with openly reactionary historians, who somehow justify the policy of fascist Germany, notes that " Hitler... he planned and planned a real World war, in which two generations (of Germans - M. K.) were to be used" (p. 650). He cites data about the Nazi program for world domination, which included the seizure of the United States, about their intentions to create a powerful navy and strategic aviation. On the other hand, he places all responsibility for developing plans for world hegemony and unleashing war on Hitler and his inner circle, ignoring those class forces whose "social order" was expressed in the program of the "world blitzkrieg". The author also does not touch upon the question of the inter-imperialist contradictions between Germany and the United States. Herwig shows the great importance attached in the plans of the aggressors to the conquest of the Soviet Union. He highly appreciates the heroic resistance of the Soviet people to the fascist invaders, but nevertheless considers Roosevelt's policy and the entry of the United States into the war to be the decisive factor in thwarting Hitler's plans for world domination (p.668).

This statement, which is characteristic of Western historiography of the Second World War, is refuted by actual data. As you know, the main theater of military operations, where the fate of the war was decided, was the Soviet-German front. Until June 1944, an average of 15-20 times more enemy troops were concentrated there than on the Allied fronts (North Africa, Italy). Even after landing in France and deploying large-scale operations in the West, the Americans, British and French were confronted by 1.8 - 2.8 times fewer Wehrmacht formations than were located in the East .6 In the battles near Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, the main, selected forces of the fascists were defeated. In general, moderate-liberal authors, while giving some interesting factual data, do not go beyond the traditional concepts of bourgeois historiography in their conclusions, like conservative historians, and do not cover up the true essence and class roots of fascism and its policies.

In the 50s and 60s, the magazine repeatedly addressed topics related to the foreign policy of Great Britain, France and the United States, primarily with the policy of "appeasement". Such well-known conservative historians as S. Bemis, B. Schmitt, D. Haight, and G. Braddick have written articles on this topic. In some cases, their writings were critical of the appeasers, but the main goal was to justify this course. The essence of the policy of "appeasement" - encouraging aggression against the USSR-was hidden in every possible way 7 . In the following years, interest in the policy of "appeasement" noticeably decreased, but the magazine's position on this issue did not change. This is evidenced by G. Levin's article " The Mediator: Karl Burckhardt's attempts to prevent World War II "(1974, No. 3), which describes the activities of the League of Nations Commissioner in Danzig in the last months before the war and his participation in informal Anglo-German negotiations. Levin's very approach to the problem is characteristic: he sees international relations as the result of the activities of individuals, such as Burckhardt, Hitler, or Chamberlain, who are supposedly able to launch or prevent a war on their own (p. 439). The desire to hide the responsibility of the ruling circles of Great Britain for encouraging aggressors is manifested in the author's demonstrative refusal to consider the essence of the policy of"appeasement". He confines himself to the general observation that "there was an influential group in England who considered it desirable to reach an understanding with Hitler on the terms he had set out" (p. 445). Breaking off the episode with Burkhardt from the general line of "appeasers", the author is silent about the numerous

6 Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945 [History of the Second World War 1939-1945], vol. 12, Moscow, 1982, p. 217.

7 См. Веmis S. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (1949, N 4); Schmill D. "Munich" (1953, N 2); Haight J. France, the US and the Munich Crisis (I960, N 4); Braddick H. A New Look at American Policy during the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis, 1935 - 1936 (1962, N 1).

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the facts of unofficial probing and secret negotiations of the British leaders with Hitler's emissaries (T. Kordt, G. Voltat), when it was a question of dividing the spheres of influence between Germany and England and giving Hitler "free hands" in the East 8 .

Levin's interpretation of the facts directly related to Burckhardt's mission and his meeting with Hitler in August 1939 is no less biased. He claims that the meeting was supposedly only about German-Polish relations, and Burckhardt allegedly said on behalf of the British that "the British will stand up for Poland" (pp. 454-455). In fact, in response to the conditions put forward by Hitler (division of spheres of influence, non-interference in the event of aggression against the USSR), Burckhardt expressed the readiness of the Western powers to abandon Poland to its fate. " 9 In assessing Burckhardt's secret contacts with Hitler, Levin tries to prove that they were not of a serious nature, but were just probing, "fluctuations" caused by" incorrect information " (p.455). Thus, he justifies the policy of "appeasers" who, under the guise of negotiations with the Soviet Union, colluded with the Nazis.

A significant place on the pages of The Journal of Modern History in the 70s and early 80s was occupied by articles about the policy of the Soviet Union during the war, the relations of the countries participating in the anti-Hitler coalition. The views of researchers who address these problems are extremely anti-Soviet. They go to the direct distortion of facts, unfairly accusing the USSR of expansionism. A typical example of this is the article by A. Rezis "Spheres of influence in Soviet Diplomacy during the War" (1981, No. 3), devoted to Soviet-German relations in 1939-1941. Recognizing that the Soviet Union concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany "only when all hopes for an alliance and a military convention with Britain and France, which provided mutual protection and specific obligations, were lost" (p.42), the author completely ignores this remark in the future. He does not say that the Soviet leadership was forced to sign the treaty in order to gain time to strengthen the defense capability of the USSR and prevent anti-Soviet collusion between the West and the Axis countries. Rezne does not mention the military conflict unleashed by Japan at that time on Khalkhin Gol and the threat of a simultaneous attack on the Soviet Union from the west and east, the desire of the British and French governments to organize a joint "crusade" against communism with Hitler, the long-term efforts of our country to create a system of collective security in Europe, and does not mention the met with the support of the Western powers, about the unanswered proposals for providing military assistance to Poland in the event of Hitler's aggression. Resne also virtually ignores the negative reaction of the Soviet government in the summer of 1939 to the provocative probe of the German Foreign Ministry about "improving relations" 10 . Since the data of authoritative sources contradict the anti-Soviet conclusions of Rezis, he does not disdain to use false documents fabricated in Nazi Germany (pp. 421 - 422).

The relations of the Soviet Union with the countries participating in the anti - Hitler coalition are described in the same spirit. The author is forced to state that reactionary figures in the West, especially Churchill, made vigorous efforts to create a "cordon sanitaire" against the USSR in post-war Europe. He regards the failure of these efforts as a great success of Soviet diplomacy (p. 437). But, guided by its main goal: to falsify the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence and equal rights in international relations, Resnais tries to portray the efforts of the USSR to ensure the independence of the small countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe from the imperialist encroachments of Great Britain and the United States and their allies.

8 For more information about these negotiations, see: History of the Second World War, Vol. 2, p. 148; Sipols V. Ya. Soviet Union in the struggle for Peace and Security 1933-1939, Moscow, 1974, p. 341-343; Ovsyanny I. D. The Secret in which the war was born, Moscow, 1975.

9 Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny [History of the Second World War], vol. 2, p. 149; Ovsyanny I. D. Uk. soch., pp. 328-329.

10 See: History of the Second World War, vol. 2, pp. 279, 282-283, 289; Sipols V. Ya. Uk. soch., pp. 396-398, 401; Ovsyanny I. D. Uk. soch., pp. 348-349.

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the right to freely decide one's own fate as the division of this region into "spheres of influence" (p. 437).

The well-known sovietologist V. Mastni, author of the book "Russia's Path to the Cold War", speaks from similar positions 11 . In his article "Military Objectives of the Soviet Union at the Moscow and Teheran Conferences" (1975, No. 3), he admits that the main task of Soviet diplomacy was to create conditions for an early end to the war. However, at the same time, he grossly falsifies the reasons for this policy. V. Mastni's claim that at the end of 1943 the USSR was unable to defeat Germany without the help of the Western Allies is completely untenable (p.482). In fact, in 1943, the Soviet-German front reached a Radical turning point. The total volume of industrial production increased by 17% compared to 1942, which made it possible to increase the number and technical equipment of the Soviet troops. The beginning recovery of the national economy created prerequisites for further growth of the economic and defense power of our country. In this regard, we can refer to the head of the American military mission in Moscow, General D. Dean, who reported to Washington that the Soviet Union was able to defeat Germany on its own and its interest in the Allied landings across the English Channel had decreased .12
The anti-Soviet approach also distinguishes Mastney's assessment of the Allies ' decisions about the post-war world order. His assertions about the expansionist nature of the USSR's policy are refuted by Soviet proposals at the Moscow and Teheran Conferences aimed at eliminating the possibility of a new aggression against our country and rebuilding international relations on a fair basis. The Soviet side's firm position in defense of Poland's national interests and recognition of its western borders, in defending the right of France to the status of a great power and equal partnership in the coalition, manifested the Soviet Union's desire for truly equal and democratic international relations. An important role in thwarting the imperialist plans of the Western powers in relation to the countries of Central and South - Eastern Europe was played by the Soviet leadership's support for the sovereignty of Austria, Hungary and the Balkan countries13 .

The example of the articles by Resis and Mastney clearly showed the anti-historical concepts of reactionary historiography, their organic connection with the political doctrines of official Washington. The publication of such articles at a time of increasing aggressiveness of American imperialism was designed to inflate the myth of the "Soviet threat". The efforts of bourgeois historians aimed at blaming the USSR for the collapse of the anti-Hitler coalition and the "division of Europe into opposing blocs" are subordinated to the ideological justification of the current anti-Soviet policy of the US government.

The growing reactionary tendencies in American historiography are reflected in the work of R. R. Tolkien. Stolfi, " Returning to the Barbarossa Plan: A Critical Reassessment of the Initial Stage of the Russo-German Campaign (June-December 1941) "(1982, No. 1). Analyzing the temporary successes of the Wehrmacht in the first months of the war, he provides arguments typical of reactionary (primarily West German) historians of the 50s. It was from them that he borrowed his thesis that the "dilettante" Hitler's orders disrupted the schedule for the implementation of the "Barbarossa" plan, thanks to which the Soviet command was able to form new armies to replace those "destroyed" in the first weeks of fighting (p. 43). Another reason for the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, he also, in full accordance with the traditions of revanchist historiography, considers the "whims" of the Russian climate (p. 46). Stolfi is extremely biased in the selection of sources: he relies mainly on documents of the German high Command and ignores Soviet data. Similar inter-

11 Мastnу V. Russia's Road to Cold War. N. Y. 1979.

12 Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945 [History of the Second World War 1939-1945], vol. 7, Moscow, 1977, pp. 512, 513.

13 See. Israelyan V. L. Anti-Hitler Coalition, Moscow, 1964, p. 307 - 308, 313 - 314, 345 - 346; History of Diplomacy, vol. 4. Moscow, 1975, pp. 411-412, 424; History of the Second World War, 1939-1945, vol. 8. Moscow, 1977, pp. 35-38; The Soviet Union in Russian international conferences of the period of the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Sb. dokl., vol. 1, 1978, pp. 70-71; vol. 2, 1978, pp. 164, 166, 167.

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The interpretation of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War was convincingly refuted by Soviet historical science, which proved that the Barbarossa plan was thwarted by the heroic resistance of the Red Army and the entire Soviet people .14 The appeal of a modern American historian to the concepts of the "Cold War" period, outdated even by the concepts of bourgeois science, is very significant. Stolfi's apologization of the Barbarossa plan as a plan of anti-Soviet aggression and his attempts to explain the defeat of Hitler's Germany by random factors reflect the escalation of militarism in the official ideology of the United States.

The journal's publications on the subject of World War II revealed the desire to use history for ideological purposes, the close connection of bourgeois historiography in the United States with reactionary political doctrines.

14 See Dashichev V. I. Bankruptcy of the Strategy of German Fascism, vol. 2, Moscow, 1973, pp. 200-201; Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voiny 1939-1945, vol. 4, Moscow, 1975, ch. 3.

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